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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE LIMITING OF
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MICHAEL E. GELTNER*
From the time that the Supreme Court of the United States, writing
through Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Peters,1 confirmed the
supremacy of judgments of the United States district courts over agencies
of state government, restriction of district court powers has been a con-
tinuing objective of the states' righters. In recent years, with the expan-
sion of district court interference in state prosecutions following Dombrow-
ski v. Pfistelr,2 constitutional decisions of the district courts have become
a most important mode of restricting the power of state government.
It was then to be expected that the Supreme Court would be faced with a
broad challenge to the continuing level of district court activity in that
area. In February, 1971, after a period in which change was in the
wind,3 the Supreme Court filed decisions in six cases dealing with district
court power to interfere with enforcement of state criminal laws.4
Lack of unanimity among the members of the Court was reflected in
the 17 separate opinions filed in the six cases.5 It was at least common
ground, however, that the Court narrowed the apparent meaning of its
earlier decision in Donbrowski v. Pfister,' and repudiated a growing body
of lower court law7 which held that a claim of facial unconstitutionality of
a state criminal statute on first amendment related grounds was sufficient
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
19 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
2 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 See, e.g., Dexter v. Schrunk, 400 U.S. 1207 (1970) (opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, as
Circuit Justice, denying application for a restraining order based upon Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965) on the ground that it was "up for re-examination in cases set for reargue-
ment this fall").
4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), rev'g Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D.
Cal. 1968); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), aff'g 288 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. N.Y. 1968);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), reveg Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), rev'g in part and vacating and remanding in part, Delta
Book Distributors v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971), vacating and remanding, Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969); Byrne
v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971), vacating and remanding, Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp.
1363 (D. Mass. 1969). To simplify discussion, except when considering specific cases, I will
refer to these cases collectively under the name of the first case reported in the United States
Reports, Younger v. Harris, the name under which they are most often discussed.
5 Sapra note 4.
6 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court may have done the same with less fanfare in Cameron
v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
7See, e.g., P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970); Strasser v. Doorley,
309 F. Supp 716, 722 (D.R.I. 1970) (municipal ordinance); Morrison v. Wilson, 307 F. Supp.
196 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala.
1969).
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in itself to cause a United States district court to reach the merits of an
unconstitutionality claim.8
It is the purpose of this article to consider, more generally, whether
Younger v. Harris and the other decisions are likely to substantially change
the powers of United States district courts when dealing with the conduct
of state government or whether, on the contrary, the view that the Su-
preme Court has committed itself to ending the active role of the district
courts in using federal remedies to control state legislative, executive and
administrative action is erroneous.9
At this point, it seems appropriate to state the outline of my position
and the philosophical orientation behind it. I believe that the Younger
decisions affect only the narrow subject of when a federal district court
can grant coercive relief against state prosecutions and are properly con-
fined to two kinds of cases. The first of these are cases in which a plain-
tiff in a federal court action seeks an injunction or declaratory judgment
against enforcement based on asserted unconstitutionality, of a state crimi-
nal statute or ordinance. In such a case, I believe, the Court has held that
the plaintiff must be prepared to show more than that inhibitions have
arisen as a result of the existence of the statute.'0 The other kind of case
is one in which a state criminal charge is pending against the person who
becomes the plaintiff in an action in a federal district court seeking to en-
join the state authorities from continuing the prosecution." In such a
case, I believe, the Court has merely held that, unless there are exceptional
circumstances, a district court may not reach the merits without first finding
that the prosecution was brought in bad faith. I do not believe that the
Court made any other new law. The holdings just mentioned should
properly be stated so as to reflect the tentative nature of the Court's posi-
tion; they do not limit instances of relief against state prosecutions solely
to bad faith situations, because of the "exceptional circumstances" lan-
guage.'" Moreover, the decisions have little or no application in cases
8 Such consideration would ordinarily come before a three-judge district court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1964). But see, e.g., Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716 (D.R.I. 1970) (single judge
considering constitutional challenge to municipal ordinance); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp.
968 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd sub. uom., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (portion of case
dealing with challenge to municipal ordinances; remainder of claims heard by three-judge court).
9 I have framed the issue so broadly because, in discussions with lawyers on both sides of
the issue, the ultimate question, as they see it, is whether the doors of the federal courts will be
shut to the whole class of cases.
101 will consider below whether this holding is based on doctrines of ripeness, standing or
equity jurisprudence. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (opinion of Black,
J.).
11 Sometimes, the objectives of such a case may also be accomplished by a declaratory judg-
ment. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93, 98 et seq. (1971).
12 Justice Black, writing for a majority in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), used the
words "any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief." 401 U.S. at 54.
Justice Stewart, concurring, wrote "in exceptional and extremely limited circumstances." 401
U.S. at 56.
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other than the kind just mentioned and should not be read to further limit
district court power.
My belief that the Younger decisions should be read restrictively is,
in part, based upon my belief that an unshackled federal judiciary is a
necessary prerequisite to a viable body of personal liberties under our fed-
eral system of government. Federal district judges, secure in their life-
time appointments and, hopefully, insulated from the pressures on officials
close to the political processes, are capable of an honest approach to con-
stitutional issues. I have seen no evidence that, as a general matter, the
state judiciary has similar capacity. On the contrary, the need of most
state judges to stand for re-election, the continuing influence of political
parties -in the selection process, and the relatively small districts in which
state lower court judges run for office. reflects a system designed to foster
maximum receptiveness to the views of a local majority. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's caseload has expanded to the point where it cannot be
expected to review all of the cases filed from state courts which involve
arguably meritorious claims of civil rights violations. Thus, continued
district court activity is needed to assure that the conduct of state govern-
ments is faithful to the guarantees of liberties provided by the Constitu-
tion.' s
I. THE CASES
A. Younger v. Harris
Younger v. Harris,14 was an action to enjoin enforcement of The Cali-
fornia Syndicalism Act,15 which the Supreme Court had upheld in Whit-
ney v. California in 1927.8 The Act provided criminal penalties for a
13 My perspective on some of these issues has been affected by participation, of counsel, in
several cases arising out of the Kent State University shootings of May 4, 1970 which involve
some of the issues which will be touched upon in this piece. King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653
(N.D. Ohio 1970), ree/d, No. 71-0194 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1971) is a federal court action seeking
to enjoin state court judges from enforcing two injunctive orders, one against public statements
by grand jury witnesses and one against picketing, pamphleteering and other speech-related
conduct in the vicinity of a courthouse. Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio
1971), afl'd, No. 71-1278 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1971) (as amicus curiae) is a federal court action
seeking to enjoin state authorities from prosecuting persons indicted by a state grand jury which,
simultaneous with the indictments, filed a grand jury report which, it is claimed, compromised
the state court defendants' opportunity for a fair trial. Morgan v. Rhodes, No. C70-961, (N.D.
Ohio March 4, 1971) (granting motion to dismiss), No. 71-1335 (6th Cir. filed April 29, 1971)
is an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against a series of National Guard prac-
tices asserted to violate the United States Constitution. Morgan v. Hayth, No. C70-691
(N.D. Ohio filed Aug. 1970) is an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitu-
tional grounds against searches of college dormitory rooms by state and local officials. Fridrich
v. Brown, No. C71-140 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 11, 1971) is an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on constitutional and federal statutory grounds against enforcement of a pro-
vision of state election laws.
14 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
15CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (1970).
16274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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series of activities, including "teaching, advocating," and "deliberate justi-
fication" of syndicalism, which it defined as criminal violence to effect
political change. The district court, in Younger, held the act to be fa-
cially unconstitutional on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. About a
year later, the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated an almost identi-
cal statute on appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio 17
affirming a conviction under it. Thus, when the Court heard argument
in Younger v. Harris on the prosecutor's appeal from the district court,
the threshhold jurisdictional questions were dearly presented.
Harris was indicted under the California Syndicalism Act and brought
suit in the district court to enjoin his own prosecution. Dan and Hirsch
intervened in the suit, seeking a declaratory judgment of the unconstitu-
tionality of the Act and alleging that they were members of a socialist
political party and would be inhibited in the exercise of their first amend-
ment right of peaceful advocacy unless relief were granted. Another
intervenor, Broslawsky, a history instructor, joined this request on the
ground that Harris' prosecution and the existence of the Act inhibited his
teaching about the doctrines of Karl Marx and other revolutionaries.
The district court did not state whether the latter three plaintiffs were
seeking a stop to the Harris prosecution based solely on the Harris exam-
ple, but simply issued a declaratory judgment as to all instances of use of
the Act and enjoined prosecution of the pending case against Harris."8
Eight members of the Supreme Court concurred in the reversal deci-
sion. Justice Black, writing for the majority," first concluded that the ac-
tion had to be dismissed as to Dan, Hirsch and Broslawsky, because they
were not proper persons to seek relief. While Justice Black stated quite
clearly that a "feeling of inhibition" is insufficient basis for relief, he
did little more to articulate the precise reason or reasons why such an al-
legation, if proved, is insufficient basis for relief when joined with a claim
of facial unconstitutionality of a state statute on first amendment
grounds.20 At least seven members of the Court agreed with Justice Black
on this issue.2 '
17 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), rev'g Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
IsHarris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), discussion of relief at 516-517.
:0Justice Black's opinion was for the Court, a majority consisting of the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun, Harlan and Stewart. The latter, however, joined by Justice Harlan, filed
a separate concurring opinion setting forth a separate and probably more restricted, position,
in Samuels v. fackell, Dyson v. Stein and Byrne v. Karalexis, supra, note 4.
20 The one case cited in support was Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), in which
the court found the action moot and, as a consequence, held that there was no actual controversy,
a limitation based upon article III of the Constitution and, therefore applicable both to injunction
actions and actions under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). Cf. Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 98 et seq. (opinion of Justice Brennan dealing with pertinence of De-
claratory Judgment Act). Citation of Golden v. Zwickler would suggest that the decision here
was based on ripeness grounds. See also opinion of Justice Brennan, 401 U.S. at 57-58. How-
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The more difficult issue in the case was whether Harris' claim that he
was being prosecuted under a facially unconstitutional state statute was
sufficient to fall within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,' which
prohibits a federal court from issuing injunctions "to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments." Harris' contention was that the Civil Rights Act2 3 is an
"expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act and that, in
any action satisfying the requirements of the former Act, relief must be
granted irrespective of the latter Act.24  Justice Black, however, did not
directly treat the Civil Rights Act contention as dispositive. Rather, he
assumed that an action meeting the prerequisites for injunctive relief,
namely a unique showing of "irreparable damages," would satisfy "a
judicial exception" ' to the Anti-Injunction Act.2 6 He held, however, that
a claim of facial unconstitutionality was not enough and that Harris'
failure to allege that the prosecution was brought in bad faith or for pur-
poses of harassment or fell within "any other unusual circumstances
that would call for equitable relief" precluded the Court from reaching
ever, the language used, see 401 U.S. at 42, tends to suggest a mere holding on when equitable
relief is proper, jurisdiction having already attached.
2 1 Justice Douglas, dissenting in Younger v. Harris and Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 58 et seq.
(1971) was in disagreement with the court's decision in both cases, but nowhere states flatly
that he would consider Dan, Hirsch or Broslawsky to be proper plaintiffs.
2228 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
2342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
24 Although the issue rarely comes up in the courts of appeals, a split seems to have developed
in the circuits as to whether the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), is an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). Compare Honey
v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970), Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.
1969), Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F. 2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) and Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F. 2d
119 (3d Cir. 1950) with Baines v. Danville, 337 F. 2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), Goss v. Illinois, 312
F. 2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963) and McLucas v. Palmer, 427 F. 2d 239 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 309 F.
Supp. 1353 (D. Conn. 1970). See generally Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State
Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L REV. 535 (1970).
25 401 U.S. at 43.
2 6 This conclusion is not indisputable. Justice Black's opinion noted a "judicial exception"
to the policy against enjoining State criminal proceedings for cases in which, in the absence of
injunctive relief, irreparable harm will be suffered, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
It would follow from that position that, if a case for injunctive relief were made out in an action
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), the Anti-Injunction Act would be no bar.
That conclusion is supported by the fact that, in Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) and
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971), the Court vacated and remanded for a finding on whether
"irreparable harm", as defined in the decisions, was present. It would be futile to remand if the
Court were to later hold that, even if the appropriate findings were made, the district court
could not act.
Nevertheless, Justice Black concluded by writing that "[We have no occasion to consider
whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283 .. . would in and of itself be controlling .... " 401 U.S. at 54, and
Justice Stewart, concurring wrote, "Thus we do not decide... whether an injunction to stay
proceedings in a state court is 'expressly authorized' by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now
42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 55. See also n.3 at 56. Moreover, Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Younger, treats the majority as having rejected the position. Id. at 60-61. See also LeFlore v.
Robinson, 446 F.2d 715, 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1971) (Goldberg J., concurring).
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the merits of his claim.17  The key to Justice Black's opinion for the Court
was his position that basic concepts of equity jurisprudence determined
whether or not relief was available and that the absence of an adequate
remedy at law and the threat of serious irreparable harm if relief were
denied were prerequisites to the granting of relief. Prosecutions brought
in bad faith or solely for the purposes of harassment were, according to Jus-
tice Black, instances of "irreparable damage" serious enough to warrant
an equity court to act.
Justice Stewart's separate concurring opinion28 differed little from the
Court's except to point out the very narrow nature of the issue before the
Court. He emphasized his view that, while federalism would ordinarily
preclude the enjoining of state criminal proceedings, where the state's
law enforcement was itself lawless, as in a prosecution brought in bad
faith or to harass, the reasons to defer to state adjudication were out-
weighed by the injury caused "by the perversion of the very process which
is supposed to provide vindication."2'
Justice Douglas' dissent, covering both Younger and Boyle v. Landry,"°
argued that the Court was overruling Dombrowski v. Pfister,31 in reject-
ing the view, apparently adopted by a majority in the latter case, that
the inhibition of protected speech caused by the existence of a statute
which overbroadly punished both protected and unprotected activity was
itself sufficient basis for relief. 2  He was, of course, correct that the
Court, in Younger, was retreating from the position apparently accepted
in Dombrowski, although Justice Black's opinion in Younger character-
ized the Dombrowski language as "statements [which] were unnecessary
to the decision....".3 Interestingly, neither Justice Douglas nor Jus-
tice Black discussed what might have been the most serious issue in
Dombrowski, which was whether there should be abstention by the dis-
trict court when overbreadth in violation of the first amendment is claimed,
27 401 U.S. at 54.
2 8 For himself and Justice Harlan.
29 401 U.S. at 56.
80401 U.S. 77 (1971).
81380 U.S. 479 (1965).
32 Dombrowski, of course, was a case in which the injunction action was filed in the district
court prior to the commencement of criminal proceedings in any state court, although the latter
were threatened at the time. It was thus a perfect case for injunctive relief under equity concepts
and did not raise any problems under 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), because, as the Court pointed
out, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2, that section was no bar to enjoining future, as opposed to pending
state criminal prosecutions. In the period between Dombrowski and Younger, it was a much
disputed issue as to whether, in an action otherwise satisfying the elements of Dombrowski, but
commenced after the formal start of state proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 precluded relief, a point
raised but not decided in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), on remand 262 F. Supp.
873 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). See, e.g., Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699,
704 (5th Cir. 1969); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Dawkins v. Green,
412 F. 2d 644 (5th Cir. 1969); Baines v. Danville, 337 F. 2d 579, 593 (4th Cir. 1964); Honey
v. Goodman, 432 F. 2d 333, 338-339 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing district court decisions on point).
33 401 U.S. at 50.
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so as to permit the state courts to restrict the meaning of the state stat-
ute and, possibly, avoid the need for federal intervention. 4
B. Boyle v. Landr3 5
The Justices lined up in the same order in Boyle as in Younger and
treated the reversal decision as flowing without difficulty from the result
in the latter case. The plaintiffs had brought an action in the district
court seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against enforcement
of several Illinois statutes on the ground that they were unconstitutional."8
They alleged that some of them had been arrested and were being
prosecuted under the statutes, and that first amendment rights of Ne-
groes were being infringed by the inhibitory effect of use of the statutes
against the Negro Community through unlawful arrests and the setting of
excessive bail. They also alleged that threatened enforcement was a
result of a "... . plan or scheme of concerted action... not with an expec-
tation of securing valid convictions, but rather . . . to harass plaintiffs
and their supporters and to discourage them from asserting and exercising
their federal rights. ' 37
Justice Black noted that none of the plaintiffs had ever been prose-
cuted, arrested or charged under the statute before the Court 8 and there-
fore concluded that they were like plaintiffs Dan, Hirsch and Broslawsky
in Younger v. Harris, and reversed on that ground. In one respect, this
decision seems to be the weakest of the six cases, since the reversal ap-
parently precluded relief even if the plaintiffs were to come forward with
an offer of proof to support the allegations.29 The district court had
not made findings on the allegations or held an evidentiary hearing be-
cause it felt them to be unnecessary as a prerequisite to reaching the con-
stitutional claims. Thus, it would seem that dismissal of the case was ac-
3 4 Justice Iarlan's dissent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 et seq. (1965) was
based on the view that, since the contention was unconstitutional overbreadth, the district court
should have abstained to permit the state courts to place a narrowing construction on the state
statute.
35401 U.S. 77 (1971).
3 6 ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 25-1 (mob action) (1971), § 31-1 (resisting arrest) (1971),
§ 12-2 (aggravated assault) (1971), § 12-4 (aggravated battery) (1971), § 12-6 (intimidation)
(1971). A portion of the action claimed unconstitutionality of ordinances of the City of Chicago
dealing with disorderly conduct and resisting or interferring with police officers. The district
judge severed the ordinance portion of the case from the challenge to the statutes, sending only
the latter before a three-judge court. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. IMI. 1968). As
a result, his decision as to the ordinances was not before the Court on the appeal from the decision
of the three-judge court.
3 7 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 929, 931-32 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (opinion of Will, D. J., sum-
marizing complaint).
38The State's appeal was only from the decision below holding the intimidation statute
invalid.
39 In both Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971)
the lower court decisions were vacated and remanded for evidentiary hearings, rather than re-
versed outright, as was Boyle.
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tually a holding that, in actions to enjoin enforcement of state criminal
laws, detailed factual allegations, possibly following the lines of the "ir-
reparable harm" criteria set forth in Younger, will be required. As a gen-
eral matter, such a formalistic pleading requirement has been rejected as
anachronistic and inconsistent with the notice aspect of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.40  Only Justice Douglas, however, considered
this point, and he only touched on it peripherally.41
C. Samuels v. Mackell 42
Whereas the Boyle plaintiffs were treated like plaintiffs Dan, Hirsch
and Broslawsky in Younger, the Samuels plaintiffs were treated like Har-
ris. Indictments had been filed against Samuels and others charging viola-
tion of the New York criminal anarchy statute. Their action in federal
court, seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief, was based upon the
claim that the statute abridged first amendment freedoms and, while
there was a harassment allegation, the claim was premised upon the dis-
trict courts' ability to enjoin if it agreed with the assertion of unconstitu-
tionality. Following Younger v. Harris,43 Justice Black held that the
failure to show irreparable harm of the kind required by that decision
precluded injunctive relief and, in addition, the same considerations which
required the denial of equitable relief likewise required denial of a de-
claratory judgment.44 Thus, the Court rejected the notion that, while
enjoining a particular state prosecution might be inappropriate, a declara-
tory judgment did not fall within the Anti-Injunction Act's proscription
of "injunction[s] to stay proceedings in a State court." 45
D. Perez v. Ledesma46
The district court plaintiffs operated a newsstand in Louisiana selling
publications which local authorities thought were obscene. That thought
led to the filing of four informations in state court based upon a state
statute and a local ordinance. Plaintiffs were arrested and the alleged
obscene materials seized prior to the federal court action. A three judge
40 See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-422 (1969) (action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964)); Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 174-175 (1965); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Chiaffltelli v. Dettmer Hospital, 437 F.2d 429, 431 (6th Cir. 1971).
41401 U.S. at 64.
42401 U.S. 66 (1971).
43401 U.S. 37 (1971).
44 Unlike Harris, Samuels had joined a claim for a declaratory judgment. 401 U.S. at 69.
This conclusion appears inconsistent with one the Court took last year that, for purposes of the
three-judge court requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), a declaratory judgment is unlike an
injunction. Gunn v. University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383 (1970).
1528 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
46401 U.S. 82 (1971).
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district court held the Louisiana statute constitutional on its face and there-
fore refused to enjoin the prosecution, but it entered a suppression order
and required return of all seized material on the ground that prior to any
seizure, an adversary hearing was necessary on the question of whether
the materials were in fact obscene.47 Justice Black, writing for the Court,
held that, since the seizure issue was part and parcel of the larger state
prosecution, the same irreparable injury had to be shown to support the
suppression and return order as would be necessary to enjoin the prosecu-
tion.48 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, with Justices White and Mar-
shall concurring, was directed at the question of whether, a claim for a
declaratory judgment having been made as to the ordinance, a district
court could properly consider its constitutionality when an irreparable
harm case had not been made.49 His position was that, in a case in which
there was an actual controversy sufficient to satisfy article III of the
Constitution and the Declaratory Judgment Act, and there was no pending
state prosecution in which constitutional defenses could be vindicated," °
then a federal declaratory judgment was appropriate irrespective of
the presence or absence of bad faith, harassment or the other exceptional
circumstances. Justice Brennan thus finally reached the most obvious point
raised in Younger v. Harris but not resolved there, namely, whether in a
suit otherwise meeting the requirements of Dombrowski v. Pfister,"' the
Anti-Injunction Act was a bar to suit. His suggested resolution was as
follows: Where a state proceeding is pending, the Anti-Injunction Act is
a bar unless the irreparable injury requirement of Younger is met. In the
other kind of case envisioned in Dombrowski--one involving a state
statute which is facially unconstitutional-a pending prosecution is a bar.""
The absence of a pending prosecution, however, together with the re-
quisite elements for a live controversy, would leave the way open for
federal court relief on constitutional grounds, and the declaratory judg-
ment would ordinarily be the appropriate remedy in the absence of the ir-
reparable harm and lack of an alternative remedy needed for equitable re-
lief.-
4
7See, e.g., Adler v. Pomerleau, 313 F. Supp. 277 (D. Md. 1970); City News Center v.
Carson, 310 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
48 This view was strongly supported by the Court's earlier decision in Stefanelli v. Menard,
342 U.S. 117 (1951).
4 9 The majority did not reach this question because, since an ordinance was involved and
since the action below was a declaratory judgment, a three-judge court was inappropriate and,
therefore, they concluded that direct appeal to the Supreme Court was improper. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (1964). See Gunn v. University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S.
383 (1970); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
50 The state had filed a volle prosequi of the informations before the three-judge court
convened. 401 U.S. at 103.
51380 U.S. 479 (1965).
52 401 U.S. at 121-22.
53 This suggestion has a good deal of surface appeal as a half-way compromise between the
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Both Dyson v. Stein"' and Byrne v. Karalexis 5 involved fact situations
which, in light of the four decisions just discussed, required factual find-
ings on whether, in the former, there was bad faith or harassment and,
in the latter, whether there existed an adequate single proceeding in the
state court which could provide the requisite relief.
II. POST-YOUNGER PROSPECTS
There is no question that, within their confines, the Younger decisions
will have a most profound effect on district court activity. The area most
directly affected, obviously, will involve challenges to the constitutional-
ity of state criminal statutes. These cases fall into several categories.
A. Actions Commenced Prior to Any Signifiicant Threat
of Enforcement
One type of "challenge" case which was brought following the recep-
tiveness evidenced by Dombrowski v. Pfister,56 was the case in which a
state criminal statute was the target of an action by the plaintiff or plain-
tiffs because, while the statute had not been invoked against them in any
sense, they believed it to be a significant threat to their activities.5 7  This
type of case may call to mind Justice Black's image of a group of plain-
tiffs scouring the statute books in search of a statute to attack." It may
have been theoretically possible, without more, after Dombrowski, to
seek injunctive or declaratory relief against a state criminal statute alleged
to be vague, overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. In
fact, however, such an action remained difficult to maintain in a federal
court, because of the difficulty of establishing facial unconstitutionality.
With the exception of pure vagueness cases,59 there are very few state
apparently unequivocal, and contradictory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1964). Projecting that Justice Douglas might accept such a resolution as superior to
the state of affairs existing after Younger, there might be four votes on the court for that position
today.
54 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
55401 U.S. 216 (1971).
56 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 7 An example of such a case is Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716 (D.R.I. 1970), in which
several municipal ordinances dealing with the licensing of newsboys were attacked as infringing
the first amendment.
58 Justice Black's suggestion in Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. at 81.
59 In vagueness cases, it had generally been understood that the evil lay in the language of
the statute itself and not in its application to particular facts. See generally H. PACKER, THE
LIMITs OF THE C.Im NAL SANCTION, 85-96 (1968). Thus a statute void for vagueness was
truly unconstitutional because of the way it was written rather than the conduct it affected. It
could be challenged at the behest of even one whose conduct was controllable under a law drafted
differently. The Court last year threw some further confusion into this area. Compare Coates
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) with Palmer
v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) and United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 73 (1971) (White,
J., concurring). But see Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
and Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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criminal statutes that are not susceptible of either a narrowing interpreta-
tion to avoid application to the party before the court or a constitutional
application to some facts, even if they are not those before the court. Thus,
there was often an opportunity to abstain or to avoid the merits because
the claim of unconstitutionality was really directed to some applications
of a statute. In either case, an examination of the annotations of reported
decisions for the last few years, a possibly biased sample, produces few
cases of this type. As I read the decisions in Younger and Boyle, this sort
of action may no longer be maintained, either on article III ripeness
grounds, following Justice Brennan's position or on the ground that the
immediacy necessary for the intervention of an equity court is lacking,
following Justice Black's position.60
B. Actions Commenced After A Significant Threat of Enforcement,
but Prior to Any Formal State Court Proceedings
An instance of relief granted under Dombrowski involved cases in
which state or local government was preparing or threatening concrete
action against an identifiable group or person under a criminal statute
and that group or person commenced a federal court action prior to for-
mal commencement of state proceedings. Before Younger, such a case
appeared particularly attractive, because it followed the factual pattern
of Dombrowski. This case, too, was rare, since it involved a race to the
courthouse which was hard to win because of the way in which state crim-
inal proceedings are often started. 61 Its theoretical availability, however,
combined with the spectacle of the result turning on which lawyer
gets to which courthouse first, made stronger the argument for allowing
similar actions to be commenced after a state prosecution had started. As
I read Younger v. Harris, this action can no longer be maintained unless
the elements requisite for a finding of irreparable harm sufficient to en-
join an already pending proceeding are met. I think that this result
follows from the fact that the Younger opinion characterizes the issue not
as a problem under the Anti-Injunction Act but rather as one common to
all equity actions of the general type.2 In a way, the symmetry of this
60 Here, of course, it is possible to argue that, if article III is satisfied and grounds for an
injunction are lacking, a declaratory judgment should still issue, as Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices White and Marshall, did in Perez, 401 U.S. at 98 et seq. See text accompanying note
49 supra. That argument would depend on the view that the remaining six Justices, in Perez,
did not reach the point because of their conclusion that the order was not appealable. The
problem, of course, is that Justice Black elsewhere characterized the requisites for declaratory
relief to be almost identical with those for injunctive relief, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. at
73, a position which commanded five votes.
61 See, e.g., Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968); Honey v. Goodman, 432
F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970).
62 Justice Stewart's concurring opinion limits the issue to "a criminal prosecution which is
contemporaneously pending in a state court," 401 U.S. at 55, so that it can fairly be said that
two of the five majority votes did not go so far and that Justices Brennan, White and Marshall
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position seems preferable, although I would have preferred a symmetrical
result more along the lines suggested by the dissent in Younger.
C. Actions Commenced in Federal Court While Formal
State Proceedings are Actually Pending
The post-indictment, information or arrest action is, obviously, the
core of the issue. Here, there can be little dispute that, prior to the is-
suance of either injunctive or declaratory relief against enforcement of a
criminal statute, irreparable harm must be shown. There may, however,
be room for considerable expansion of the instances of irreparable harm
beyond the bad faith and harassment standards.
1. What is Bad Faith?
A recent decision of a district court in Hammond v. Brown' points up
some of the problems involved in the bad faith standard. On May 4,
1970, after a weekend of demonstrations and disruptions, Ohio National
Guard troops opened fire into a crowd of students on Kent State Univer-
sity's campus, in Portage County, Ohio, killing four and wounding nine,
under circumstances in which the legitimacy of the use of deadly force
was highly questionable. 4  Local opinion was polarized. Several State
officials made strong statements indicating hostility to college students
as a group and supporting the actions of the troops. The Governor of
the State was publicly criticized in some quarters for having caused the
deaths. After a three month delay, he ordered the Attorney General of
the State to convene a special grand jury in Portage County to be di-
rected by special prosecutors under the Attorney General's office. The
special grand jury ultimately filed indictments, mostly under state riot stat-
utes, covering 25 persons, all of whom, apparently, came from the
group of students, university personnel and young persons against whom
local sentiment was directed. None of the National Guard troops or
State officials were indicted. In fact, at the same time as the indictment,
a grand jury report was filed which exonerated the troops and came close
to blaming the killings on a general group which included the indicted
persons.
might consider the case appropriate for a declaratory judgment. The logic of the majority posi-
tion Justice Stewart concurred in would run to the contrary.
03Compare 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1278 (6th Cir.), with
Adamek v. Brown, No. C 70-1039, on appeal (6th Cir. No. C 71-1279), appeal of defendant
dismissed October 5, 1971.
4 See, e.g., DEPT. OF JusTIcE, SUMMARY OF F.B.I. REPORT ON KENT STATE KILLINGS
(July, 1970); KENT STATE UNrvERSITY PREsrDENT's INQUIRY COMMISSION, MINORITY RE-
PORT (1971); PRESIDENT'S CONMSSION ON CAMPUS UNREST, REPORT ON KENT STATE
UNIVERSITY (1970); Akron Beacon Journal, Special Kent State Section, A17-24, May 24, 1970;
I. F. STONE, THE KILLINGS AT KENT STATE: How MURDER WENT UNPUNISHED, (1970);
J. mSTERHAS & M. ROBERTS, THIRTEEN SEcONDS: CONFRONTATION AT KENT STATE, (19-
70); P. DAviES, AN APPEAL FOR JUSTICE, (1971) (unpublished to date).
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Some of the indicted persons brought suit seeking, among other things,
to enjoin the conduct of any prosecutions under the indictments on the
ground, inter alia, that the prosecutions were brought in bad faith by
state officials.6 5 The evidence adduced in support of the "bad faith" con-
tention included testimony that the grand jury had excluded from its in-
quiry any consideration of allegations of misconduct by National Guard
or governmental officials, and that the special prosecutors had with-
held relevant evidence from the grand jurors. Further testimony indi-
cated that the grand jury report was prepared by the special prosecutors
and that the Attorney General had held a meeting with the grand jury
foreman alone to discuss the content of the grand jury report, which
was, in substance, an exoneration of the State government. In addition,
the plaintiffs relied on the fact of the simultaneous filing of the grand jury
report and indictments and their content, the contention that the Attorney
General and special prosecutors must have known of the prejudicial
effect on a fair trial of such a report,6" the claimed motive of the State ad-
ministration to obtain a public exoneration of its prior conduct and the
stated views of some of the prosecutors concerning the legitimacy of the
National Guard's conduct. None of the defendants admitted to bad faith
or conceded that they were operating out of motives other than the fair
enforcement of the State's criminal law. The Court found that there was
no proof of bad faith.6 7
Hammond points up several of the problems created by a "bad faith"
standard, not the least of which is definitional. It is to be expected that
the question, "did you commence the prosecution in bad faith?" will not
ordinarily elicit an affirmative answer from state or local officials. There-
fore, there must be a workable definition of what state of mind of the
prosecutor is the necessary element for an injunction before problems of
proof can be considered. I believe this is so because I expect that there
will not be a retreat from the rather solid position that mere selectivity
in the enforcement of the criminal law is not a basis for the kind of bad
faith finding which would abort the proceeding.68 Selectivity, of course,
can be part of the evidentiary basis on which a bad faith finding rests in a
particular case,69 but it does not provide the necessary definitions. Cases
65 Although the district court's decision pre-dated Younger, the Sixth Circuit, in Honey v.
Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970), had announced similar "bad faith" standards which
the district court was applying.
66 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
67 323 F. Supp. at 353.
6 8 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349
(8th Cir. 1971). Cf. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
69 The result in Hammond would tend to belie that statement, because it would be hard
except in obvious cases of racial discrimination, to find greater selectivity. The plaintiffs' in-
ability to tie selective enforcement to other evidence toward a bad faith conclusion was in part
a result of the district judge's ruling that he would not permit the federal proceeding to develop
into a consideration of the relative weight of the evidence against those indicted to the evidence
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preceding Younger have tended to focus on either a disingenuous manner
of conducting state proceedings70 or an apparent vendetta7 ' as the basis for
the bad faith finding. I find the latter impossible to sensibly distin-
guish from harassment, which I would define, in this context, as "use of
the criminal process to intimidate or otherwise prevent another from
achieving an objective." 72  It would seem to me that the ultimate focus of
the bad faith issue, if it is to have meaning, ought to be on what it is
the prosecutor hopes to achieve by commencing the state proceeding.7
If he has no particular stake in the matter other than to enforce the crim-
inal law, or cannot be shown to have one, it is hard to make a case of bad
faith. If, on the other hand, his purpose is to achieve a result other than
simply the prevention of conduct which the particular provision of the
criminal law was enacted to affect,74 there is both selectivity and discrimi-
natory purpose of the kind which should abort the proceeding. 5 Proof,
of course, will inevitably be difficult in an area in which a purpose must
be inferred from conduct which, on its face, is arguably legitimate, espe-
cially when few admissions of guilt can be expected. It is, however, a
normal matter to deduce a state of mind from circumtantial evidence78
and has already been done in this context.77
against those not indicted. 323 F. Supp. at 337. Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 559,
563 (1956).
7 0 See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969).
71 See, e.g., Sokol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (ED. La. 1968) and Duncan v. Perez, 321 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
72 See, e.g., Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971); Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d
333 (6th Cir. 1970); Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. Selma, 327
F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971). I would thus treat multiple prosecutions, standing alone, as
different from harassment or bad faith. See, e.g., P.B.I.C. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass.
1970). Such prosecutions might very likely be a separate instance of irreparable harm in cases
like obscenity prosecutions. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
73 This is obviously "motive" analysis, which has always proved incongenial to those used
to talking about "intent" or "purpose." See, e.g., State v. Lancaster, 167 Ohio St. 391, 149
NE.2d 157 (1958). See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 243 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting).
74 The harassment-vendetta cases cited note 72 supra would fall under this formulation, as
would a contention such as the one in Hammond, if believed, that a prosecution was brought
to exonerate the governor. Furthermore, it might be possible to back into this position by show-
ing that, while motive is not directly proved, it can be inferred in a case in which the prosecu-
don knows it has no hope of securing valid convictions, as when it knows the criminal statute
to be unconstitutional. But cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (continuing prose-
cution under statute almost identical to one declared unconstitutional).
75In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), the court rejected the view that the selective
enforcement claim before it rose to a constitutional violation, but suggested that if selection was
based on race "or other arbitrary classification," a finding of denial of equal protection might
be made. 368 U.S. at 456. In a case such as Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), the nub of the grievance case was as much selectivity as the facial unconstitutional-
ity of the statute.
7 0 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
7 7 See, e.g., Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968). Since "bad faith" is treated
as a factual conclusion to be inferred from the evidence, the district judge assumes greater im-
portance. Whereas, there is no limit to the scope of review of a district court decision on a
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2. What Are Other Unusual Circumstances Justifying Injunctive
Relief Against A Pending Criminal Proceeding?
As I read the opinions, Justice Black's allusion to "other unusual cir-
cumstances that would call for equitable relief,' 78 may contain sufficient
elasticity for the district courts to continue to intervene in state criminal
proceedings whenever it can fairly be said that a defect in state proce-
dure7 1 or the state's prior conduct of the proceedings makes it unlikely
that a prompt and fair adjudication can be had. This is especially so in
cases involving first amendment facial unconstitutionality claims in which
the "chilling effect" on speech referred to in Dombrowski"' may cause
irreparable injury. If it is so that the state proceedings appear to be un-
fair and do not promise speed, a strong case can be made for permitting
a federal decision to occur early. The more obvious case is one in which
past conduct of governmental officials not amounting to bad faith never-
theless has compromised the state judicial process so as to undermine fair
fact finding.8' Thus, I find persuasive after Younger the contention in
Hammond v. Brown 2 that the participation of a state court judge in the
issuance of a grand jury report prejudicial to fair trial because of its
tainting effect on the potential venire ought to be an independent ground
for relief. This is so because it undermines the basis for confidence in the
fairness of the state adjudicatory mechanism. I would expect that many
other equally persuasive claims will arise once it sinks in that the focus
is no longer on the facial unconstitutionality of the statute but rather the
particular case before the court.
3. Relief
The individualized focus of the issue in Younger would tend to indi-
claim of unconstitutionality, a finding of "bad faith" is probably reversible only if "dearly er-
roneous." Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Thus, in two recent "bad faith" decisions, both going
different ways, perfunctory affirmances were based upon Rule 52(a). Compare Duncan v.
Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 321 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970) with Hammond
v. Brown, No. 71-1278 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1971), af'g 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
There is, of course, substantial precedent for a broader scope of review of mixed questions of
fact and law. See, e.g., Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S. S. Lines, 360 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1966);
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1947).
78 401 U.S. at 54.
79 For example, such as the one raised by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Cf.
Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969).
80 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
81 The primary interest of the state in avoiding transfer of a constitutional claim from state
to federal court ought to be in its control of the fact-finding process relevant to the constitutional-
icy claim. That is, one way or another, state court determinations on claims of statutory unconsti-
tutionality are subject to federal court review, cf. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,
257 U.S. 282 (1921), quite possibily at the district court level via habeas corpus petition. It
makes a big difference, however, who has found the facts underlying the unconstitutionality
claim, especially if the claims are of unconstitutional application. Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963).
82 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1278 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1971). The
per curiam opinion did not discuss this point.
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cate that relief will be restricted to the case at hand. For example, a
plaintiff's claim that a state criminal statute is being misused against him
in bad faith by a prosecutor is essentially a dispute between the plaintiff
and the prosecutor. The case is thus unlike the simple claim that a par-
ticular statute affects one's activities and is facially unconstitutional. The
latter instance is an appropriate case for relief enjoining all future prose-
cutions under the statute or declaring it invalid; the former is an appro-
priate case for enjoining the particular prosecution or all future prose-
cutions by that prosecutor under that statute (or related ones) against
that plaintiff.83  There will, of course, be many variations in fact situations,
but, in general, it will probably be so that the bad faith aspect of a-
case is separable from the question of statutory invalidity. Moreover,
a claim of irreparable harm based on some fatal deficiency in the state
fact-finding process for the particular case would likewise lead toward re-
lief geared only to that case, unless the defect was built into all future
enforcement of the statute.
D. Actions in Federal Court to Enjoin State Civil Proceedings8
I do not believe that district court power to enjoin state civil proceed-
ings is adversely affected by the Younger decisions, Justice Stewart
was careful to point out the limits of that decision, writing:
We do not deal with the considerations which should govern a federal
court when it is asked to intervene in state civil proceedings, where, for
various reasons, the balance might be struck differently.85
The focus here must be on state proceedings of a coercive or injunctive
nature which affect rights of expression, because it will be rare that the
kind of irreparable injury required by Younger will be present in an ac-
tion for money damages.8 6 In the former kind of case, I believe that
Younger strengthens the argument for federal injunctive relief, because
83 The court in Taylor v. Selma, 327 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971) disagrees with this.
analysis, using harassment in a particular case and the unconstitutionality of the statute as a basis.
for enjoining all future enforcement. The court noted, "as written, the statute is an easy ve-
hicle for the supression of unpopular causes and thoughts." Id. at 1193.
84 Characterization here as "civil" or "criminal" may be a crucial issue. In King v. Jones,
319 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ohio 1970), rev'd, No. 71-0194 (6th Cir. Oct 22, 1971) plaintiffs.
sought to enjoin enforcement of two "orders" issued by the state court which filed the indict-
ments in issue in Hammond. One proscribed public statements by grand jury witnesses and
the other prohibited picketing, pamphleteering and other speech-related activities in the area
of the courthouse. Plaintiffs, throughout, referred to the documents as "injunctions" and
treated the matter as civil. Defendants referred only to "orders" and treated them as incidental
to a criminal proceeding. The district court referred to "restraining orders" and issued an in-
junction. The reversing court of appeals used the "orders" characterization.
85 401 U.S. at 55. In a footnote, he pointed out that, historically, injunctions against state
civil proceedings have been easier to come by. Id., n.2. But cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
86 Such a case will usually be an adequate remedy at law in itself. There may be excep-
tions, such as a tax action against a newspaper commenced by an order attaching its printing
presses, but I would classify such a case as a "coercive proceeding."
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I read it as holding that, if irreparable injury is threatened by the with-
holding of federal relief, the Anti-Injunction Act is no bar to relief.
When a federal court is presented with an outstanding state injunction
which forbids conduct which is protected by the first amendment, it is
dealing with the most obvious kind of irreparable harm. The prior
restraint creates a continuing injury to first amendment rights until it is
removedY7  Accordingly, the lower federal courts have shown a pre-
Younger inclination to grant relief, and I expect it to continue. 88 A
special distinction between state civil and criminal proceedings may lie
in the fact that determinations of fact and law in criminal cases are the-
oretically always subject to reopening by petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus. 9 Conversely, under existing law, issues decided or in issue in a
state proceeding may not be relitigated in a later federal one. 0
E. Civil Rights Actions Not Involving State Criminal or Judicial Process
Historical restrictions on the granting of federal relief in actions under
the Civil Rights Act against the enforcement of state non-criminal stat-
utes, in the absence 'of Anti-Injunction Act considerations, include the
abstention doctrine,9 1 a requirement of exhaustion of state or administra-
tive remedies 2 and-article III concepts of standing, ripeness and moot-
ness.9 I can see no way in which such cases are affected by the Younger
decisions0 4 The suggestions of Justice Harlan's Dombrowski dissent that
the abstention doctrine had application in an unconstitutional over-
87 See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Carroll v.
Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). For example, if an order similar to the one sought
by the federal government in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971),
were issued by a state court, the irreparable harm would be clear.
88 See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969); Machesky v,
Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ohio 1970),
-rev'd, No. 71-1094 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1971). But cf. McLucas v. Palmer, 309 F. Supp. 1353
(D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 427 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1970). Since a state injunction cannot be chal-
lenged, even on constitutional grounds, in an action for contempt against one who has violated
its terms, Walker v. Bermingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), a federal injunctive remedy appears
most attractive.
89 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
00 See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). In Florida State Board of Dentistry v.
Mack, 401 U.S. 960 (1971), two members of the Court dissented from a denial of certiorari
because they wanted to consider the issue of whether a state court determination is res judicata
as to a subsequent federal court action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
91 See, e.g., Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). This doctrine has
been only sparingly authorized in actions challenging state statutes on the ground that they in-
fringe upon political rights. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Baggett v.
'Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
92 If applicable at all after McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe
-v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The exhaustion doctrine is very restricted in this context.
93 See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943).
94 This position was explicitly accepted recently by a panel of the Fifth Circuit in Hobbs v.
'Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
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breadth case involving a criminal statute9 5 was never followed up by the
Younger opinions, none of which consider that issue.
The related kind of Civil Rights Act case is the one in which the plain-
tiff is complaining about the conduct of state officials rather than the
content of state statutes. Here some of the same restrictions exist, and
there may be problems concerning the availability or feasibility of relief,9"
but I see nothing in the Younger opinions which adversely affects the
district courts' power to grant relief in such cases.97
III. CONCLUSION
I believe the decision in Younger v. Haris and its companion cases
was unfortunate, but less so than its advance notices. The federal district
courts ought to provide an available remedy for any person with a
federal constitutional grievance against a state criminal statute sufficiently
concrete to satisfy article III requirements. In this area, unless there is
a fair possibility that state courts will interpret a statute to avoid the consti-
tutional problems while still effectuating the legislature's purpose, I see
no legitimate interest of our federal system that would require withhold-
ing relief. I would say the same where the state criminal process has
started to grind, except where the state fact-finding process, operating
legitimately, can have an influence on the outcome of the constitutional
issue.
Cases of bad faith or "unusual circumstances" involving already-pend-
ing state criminal proceedings are different and, here, I believe the two
standards just mentioned have sufficient flexibility to be lived with, al-
though particular federal judges' attitudes will be more important in the
resolution of each case.
The decisions, however, involve a narrow portion of the much broader
area of injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act. I expect the Su-
preme Court's new majority to commence a long period of dialogue in
that area. I do not think, however, that Younger v. Harris is the begin-
ning of the end.
05 380 U.S. at 498.
90 See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cit. 1966); Schnell v. Chicago, 407
F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969).
97In Taum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, (D.C. Cr. 1971), an action to enjoin surveillance of
political activity, there is a suggestion that Younger would enhance the case for relief, because
of its emphasis on the absence of available remedies at law. A recent decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971) tends to
support that prophecy. The plaintiffs brought a class action to enjoin New Jersey State police
from harassing long-haired travelers with unreasonable stops and searches. The district court
dismissed, citing Younger as support for a broadened principle of federal court abstention.
The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that the principle built into 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)
which requires due respect for a suitor's choice of federal forum "has not been altered by the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris." 446 F.2d at 1347.
